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The depression of the 1930s had an early effect on the state of Oregon. A
decline in timber and agricultural production resulted in severe unemployment in the
late 1920s.State and local charitable organizations attempted to care for the
unemployed but they did not have the financial resources to do so. Although
President Herbert Hoover was worried about the effects of the growing economic
crisis on the business community, he continued to believe that the depression would
be short lived despite the worsening social conditions. When Franklin Roosevelt was
elected president he initiated a series of measures aimed at ending the depression
and bringing people back into the work force. Among those measures was the Works
Progress Administration (WPA).
In Oregon the WPA built upon earlier state relief organizations. However, unlike
the earlier Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the WPA was a federal
organization staffed with federal employees. Its programs were run according to
federal guidelines and regulations and much of its funding came from the federal
government. Those guidelines often worked against the state programs. The means
test, quota systems, and the need to refer programs to Washington D.C. prevented
the Oregon program from being as effective as it could be. In addition, the Oregon
legislature and governor acted against the program by not providing adequate
funding to support it.
However, even though Oregonians did not always accept the WPA, they were
dramatically changed by its programs. The most obvious change was in the physical
appearance of the state - new roads and highways, more bridges, expanded parks,
additional airports, and many new services. The state was altered politically because
by World War II, the federal government had permanently insinuated itself into the
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INTRODUCTION
The prosperity of the 1920s ended abruptly with the crash of the New York
Stock Exchange in October, 1929. Prior to the crash, the Gross National Product
(GNP) for the United States was at $104.4 billion. With only 3.2 percent of the labor
force out of work, it seemed that jobs were available for everyone. Three years later,
GNP had fallen to $74.8 billion and more than 12 million workers or 23.6 percent
of the labor force, were out of work.Such dramatic unemployment called for
dramatic solutions.Throughout the 1930s, the federal government under the
leadership of President Franklin Roosevelt and his advisors experimented with a
variety of programs to put the economy back on track. Included among the programs
that were soon referred to as the alphabetical agencies was the Works Progress (later
Projects) Administration or WPA.
The WPA was one of many federal responses to the problem of massive
unemployment which was haunting the nation.Prior to the Great Depression,
unemployment (and its attendant social evils) was a local problem. Local charitable
organizations or the family assumed responsibility for providing relief to those who
were without any other means for survival. The depression of the 1930s changed that
pattern. Sources of local funding were quickly overwhelmed and exhausted by the
enormity of the situation. Traditional methods for helping the economic victims of
the thirties were an abysmal failure; a new approach was needed.2
The dilemma facing the Roosevelt administration was determining what form
that relief should take. Should the federal government take over responsibilities for
the states and provide direct relief to the unemployed? Or should the federal
government offer some form of work relief program. (When used here, the term
"direct relief' describes the payment of money or, in some cases, goods to those in
need without requiring work in return. "Work relief' refers to the payment of money
as a salary for work which has been performed.) Politicians worried over who would
administer the program: should it be local jurisdictions, state governments, or a new
federal organization established for that purpose?
This study will explore how the State of Oregon reacted to the depression, and
how the way of handling relief changed from relying on private, local, and state
funding to looking for federal assistance. This inquiry will look at the organizations
established in Oregon to aid the unemployed: the quasi-official agencies, the more
formal state agencies, and finally the major federal agencies.While the Public
Works Administration (PWA) played a large role in providing employment
throughout the state, the focus of this study is the Works Progress Administration.
There will be some discussion of the programs of the WPA, although the concern
here is organizational: the way the WPA was organized, the agencies that preceded
it, and an assessment of its success.
The inquiry will also discuss the changes in relief funding which took place in
Oregon as a result of the depression. That is a story within a story. As the residents
of Oregon came to rely more and more on financial assistance from the federal3
government, the balance of power between the state and Washington D.C. shifted.
The spending programs of the Roosevelt administration benefitted Oregon's
economy.Yet, those programs came at the cost of increased federal control
especially in terms of the regulations imposed to administer them. While the second
World War solved the immediate unemployment problems of the state, the programs
of the 1930s, including those of the WPA, permanently altered the economic and
political relationship between the state and the federal government.'
The following chapter will discuss the response of the Hoover administration
to the stock market crash of 1929 and the economic decline that followed. It will
also look briefly at the early reactions of the administration of Franklin Roosevelt
toward the growing economic depression. Chapter two examines the Civil Works
Administration and its successor the Works Progress Administration. Chapters three,
four, and five focus on the depression in Oregon and the state and federal relief
programs designed to end it. The final chapter provides a summary and conclusion
of the WPA experience in Oregon.4
CHAPTER I
THE DEPRESSION
Although the United States had suffered previous financial crises, it had never
undergone one as long lasting and all pervasive as that touched off by the stock
market crash of 1929. The depression of the 1930s was beyond the experience of
most citizens in this country. Those caught in the middle of it wondered if life would
ever return to a normal state. According to historian William E. Leuchtenburg,
"Many believed that the long era of economic growth in the western world had come
to an end."1Everywhere people turned there was unemployment and poverty.
Industrial production slumped from $949 million to a low of $74 million between
1929 and 1932.2 Unemployment, conservatively estimated, was above twelve million
in 1932. Homelessness was on the rise and for many people a solid meal was a
memory.LesterChandler notesthat"America wastotallyunprepared
philosophically, politically, financially and administratively to cope with the massive
unemployment, loss of income, and poverty that came with the great depression."3
Much of that lack of preparedness was due to the pervasive belief that success
was a matter of individual initiative and determination.Both James Oliver
Robertson and Loren Baritz have written books about America as the land of the
chosen and the land of the rugged individual.4 To meet with failure, to be somehow
unable to take care of yourself and your family was frequently perceived as a sign of5
weakness. Baritz eloquently makes the point: "This culture detests poverty and fears
the poor. The ladder of economic mobility is a conceit of the many who have
climbed it and a reproach to the many who cannot get on it."5Obviously, in the
traditional scheme there would be some who were unable to climb that ladder for
various reasons. However, in those unfortunate cases, it was believed that local
governments and private charities would provide appropriate relief. In general, relief
whether it was direct relief or work relief was viewed as a private affair with the
burden resting upon the family or the local charitable organizations. Few expected
the state or the federal government to help the needy.
The depression of the 1930s changed those expectations. As unemployment
grew, workers clamored for some form of relief assistance. For a while, the local
agencies were able to provide help. When local funding began to dry up, some states
began filling the void through their own funding programs.Those resources,
however, were exhausted very quickly. Having nowhere else to go, states began to
turn to the federal government for help. But assistance from that quarter came
reluctantly and slowly; those who believed that the federal government had no right
to intervene in local and state affairs resisted the effort.
While federal leaders then might deny that the federal government had a role
in providing help to those in need, that denial was not based on historical fact. For
years the government had, in reality, been providing various forms of public
assistance: grants-in-aid programs to the states, monies to correctional institutions
for federal offenders, and funding for the care of disabled and wounded soldiers.66
Although those programs had broad-based support, there was, as yet, no such
tradition for the funding of relief projects.
Hoover's Response to the Depression
The policies of President Herbert Hoover reflected those contradictions.
Hoover was clearly aware that the unemployment situation in 1930 and 1931 called
for some sort of government action. While he was willing to depart from tradition
and insist that the government act to relieve suffering, he was not willing to put funds
directly in the hands of the state governments.' Hoover's policies towards relief
were a forerunner of the trickle-down policies of later administrations.Federal
money would be used to attempt to end the depression, but under Hoover those
funds would go to business, to men of affairs, not to direct relief of the poor.
Hoover believed that government should fund major projects that would be income-
producing, such as toll bridges and toll tunnels which would earn money to pay for
themselves. He regularly opposed "non-productive" public works projects.8
As the economic situation continued to worsen, Hoover moved the
government further along the path of direct relief by establishing a new program to
deal with unemployment. Headed by Arthur Woods, the program called for the
establishment of a non-partisan organization called the President's Emergency
Committee for Employment. According to Josephine Brown, a social welfare worker
and writer of the period, "The name was chosen deliberately both to indicate the7
emergency natureof thesituation and toavoid thediscouragingterm:
unemployment.° The primary job for the group was to offer advice to the states
and to coordinate unemployment assistance programs currently in effect. When the
committee recommended the creation of a federal works program, Hoover rejected
the idea.1°In his view, the committee was not intended to provide financial
assistance to state and local jurisdictions.As John Garraty has noted, "Hoover
insisted that only state and local agencies and private charities could deal properly
with such problems as unemployment and relief of the destitute."11
Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Hoover's attitude was consistent with his belief that the depression would soon
correct itself. While he continued to believe that encouraging business to invest in
the economy was the way out of the depression, he finally agreed to more direct
measures. On July 21, 1932, he signed the Emergency Relief and Construction Act,
establishing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). Title I under the Act
authorized the use of $300 million in federal monies to make loans to the states for
furnishing both direct relief and work relief. To apply for the money, states first had
to certify their need for relief funds and then apply through their governors. The
funds were grants to be paid back at a rate of 3 percent. In addition, no state could
apply for more than 15 percent of the total federal appropriations. Those provisions
illustrated the view of the Hoover administration that all states were equally hit by8
the depression, and therefore, funds must be evenly distributed.12 It also reinforced
Hoover's belief that federal funds must be viewed as loans rather than gifts.
Unfortunately, the money provided under the RFC was too little to relieve the
distress of the states.
An irritant to the states was the requirement of certification of need. This not
only infuriated many of the state governors but also slowed down the granting of
funds.13Essentially, certification was a process whereby the states were required
to assure that state funds were inadequate to meet their relief needs. While the
intent was to eliminate indiscriminate freeloading, the states interpreted it as an
attempt to prevent them from taking advantage of federal funding.14 In spite of the
certification requirement, the RFC did not try to set up an organizational structure
that would impose a federal presence in the administration of relief. Once funding
was approved, the money was handed over to the states who would then use existing
channels for delivering it to those in need.
Title II of the Reconstruction Finance Act created the bulk of the RFC
funding. It provided for $500 million that would be loaned to banks, railroads, and
other institutions threatened by financial collapse. The primary purpose of Title II
loans was to prop up the failing financial structure of the country. The RFC did not
become a potent force in the banking community until the administration of Franklin
Roosevelt, due to the innate conservatism of Hoover's administration.15Under
Roosevelt appointee Jesse Jones, the RFC sought to enlarge bank capital by
purchasing bank stock instead of loaning to banks and increasing their indebtedness.9
Those procedures allowed the banks, in turn, to increase loans to business,
municipalities, and other financial institutions.16
The Emergency Relief and Construction Act fit with Hoover's sense that relief
must not come at the expense of the free enterprise system. Although he believed
that it was necessary to end the depression and the immense suffering resulting from
it,he also believed that government action must not interfere with the
administration's long-term goal of keeping the nation's financial institutions intact.
As Lawrence Lashbrook notes in his work on the WPA in Maine, "Hoover's fear of
public relief eroding the human spirit, his dogged reliance on volunteerism and local
initiative, his opposition to government competition with private enterprise and
concern for balancing the budget barred truly effective action."17
The Depression and the Roosevelt Administration
Recognizing that more funds had to be forthcoming in order to stem the
growing relief rolls in the United States, Congress began considering legislation that
would eventually be known as the Federal Emergency Relief Act.Passed by
Congress in May of 1933, the measure was signed by the newly elected president,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It created the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
(FERA) and on May 22, Roosevelt selected Harry L. Hopkins to be FERA's first
administrator.
The FERA was both similar and different from the Emergency Relief and10
Construction Act. While both used the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as a
funding agency, the methods for granting appropriations to the states were quite
different. The RFC loaned funds to be paid back at an interest rate of 3 percent;
the $500 million provided by FERA allowed for outright gifts to the states. Under
this act, funds could be handed out on a matching basis, or they could be given as
grants to those states too poor ever to hope to be able to repay them.18Relief
whether it be direct relief or work relief would now go to anyone who was
unemployed.
FERA also went much further than the Emergency Relief and Construction
Act in providing different mechanisms for meeting relief needs. Under FERA, the
Works Division had the major responsibility for initiating federal works projects or
for supplementing state and local projects. FERA money also provided direct relief
for those who were considered unemployable (e.g. the mentally or physically
handicapped) or those who for reasons other than lack of employment opportunity
were unable to find work. Also, for the first time, a relief program was offered for
transient workers. As was the case in Oregon, transient workers were a problem in
most states and any successful relief program needed to recognize them.
Because of its organizational structure, the Federal Emergency Relief
Administration encouraged greater participation by the states in the administering
of relief funds than had been the case with the Emergency Relief and Construction
Act.Authorized loans under the latter had been made directly to political
subdivisions of the states, even though application was through the governor. A11
disadvantage to the practice was that the funds became state or local property and
therefore were not subject to federal guidelines. The federal government was unable
to press for increased standards for administering relief or hiring personne1.19 As
administrator of FERA, Harry Hopkins was determined that funding would be
administered efficiently and wisely and through the state governments.States
standing the best chance of receiving money were those who could provide good
administrative supervision:those that had established state relief boards to
administer the funds, or those that quickly moved to establish such a board. The
method of centralized dispersal of federal allocations from state governments was the
beginning step in removing relief administration from the hands of volunteer and
local bodies.2°
Under FERA, the federal government intended to exert much more control
on how its funds were administered.Unlike the laissez-faire attitude of the
Emergency Relief and Construction Act, FERA provided for investigation into how
relief funds were allocated and required governors to file monthly reports. Those
reports included information on the amount of federal funds required, the purposes
for which they would be used, and the provisions for administering them.21 Because
most states were desperate for relief assistance, they were willing to accept guidelines
that they might have resisted earlier. Forty-five states had applied for FERA funds
by June 1933 and most states had established centralized relief agencies to administer
them.22 By the end of the FERA program in 1935, over $3 billion had been spent
on state and local relief.12
According to most accounts, FERA was a reasonably successful, if stop-gap,
program.' Yet the money provided for the relief programs was inadequate to meet
the relief needs of the states.In addition, the inability of many local relief
administrators to overcome their personal repugnance about granting aid to any but
the most destitute complicated matters. Such administrators tended to be untrained
in handling relief cases and defined the truly needy in a very narrow fashion--those
who were truly incapable of providing for themselves. Moreover, since they were
without federal support, relief administrators tried to allow only the most
unemployable to be put on the relief roles. "Aging workers without skills, women
with dependent children, the temporary disabled--all were likely to be told that they
could work and were therefore ineligible for assistance."24If there were jobs
available, they were going to only the most skilled or most robust workers. Thus a
class was created of those persons who were ineligible for local relief and were also
unlikely to find employment.
A further impediment to the relief program was the provision that state
governments match all federal funds on a three-to-one basis. That provision caused
unforeseen complications because many states took funds from their already skimpy
relief budgets to meet the matching-fund requirement, while other states, particularly
in the South, lacked the matching money. In those situations, the need was so great
that the matching requirement was overlooked. In other cases, as in Oregon, a frugal
legislature dragged its collective feet in providing the additional funds. Often it took
a personal letter from Harry Hopkins threatening to cut off all federal aid before13
states would carry out their side of the bargain.
The experiences learned through the administration of the FERA programs
were incorporated into the later Works Progress Administration organization. The
WPA replicated the organizational structure of FERA in the four divisions
responsible for carrying out the programs: Research and Statistics, Relations with
the States, Work, and Rural Rehabilitation. More important, FERA staff members
were incorporated into the WPA network.By calling upon the experience, the
personnel, and the administrative network of FERA, the WPA was able to save itself




AND WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION
The origins of the Civil Works Administration and, later, the Works Progress
Administration lay in the belief of many Americans that most people would rather
work for money than have government handouts. Hopkins echoed that sentiment
when he expressed his dissatisfaction with FERA's ability to provide aid to the
unemployed by saying, "What most of them needed was not case work but a job."1
In 1933 as the relief rolls once more began to grow, Hopkins and his aide Aubrey
Williams developed a work program that would put the federal government in charge
of administering work relief. While FERA would continue to provide direct relief
grants to the states, the Civil Works Administration (CWA) would fund relief
through work programs.
The CWA, funded under Title H of the National Industrial Recovery Act, was
a response to the Roosevelt administration's fears that the winter of 1933-34 would
wreak unbearable hardships on the unemployed unless immediate aid was provided.
The CWA program was intended to remedy the defects of the FERA work-relief
program, to meet the critical unemployment needs of the winter, and to promote
recovery through an injection of purchasing power into the economic system within
a short period.2 It, too, was under the jurisdiction of Harry Hopkins. The primary15
purpose of the CWA was to provide winter employment for approximately 4 million
people and to do so as quickly as possible. While half of the workers were selected
from the relief roles, the other half were those who were unemployed but not
considered "unemployable". That policy was a deviation from earlier programs that
drew only upon relief roles and disregarded the unemployed or marginally employed.
A fundamental difference between FERA and CWA was reflected in the
administrative network of the agencies. FERA worked through the governors and
the state relief agencies, while CWA dealt with the unemployed through a newly
established federal organization. The headquarters of CWA was in Washington D.C.,
with each state, county, and city having local CWA offices. Federal administrator
Hopkins appointed the local administrators, making them federal employees. As
Kenneth Davis has noted, unlike FERA, CWA was truly a federal organization.3
The philosophy behind CWA was to provide aid through work programs
rather than providing direct relief. Foreshadowing WPA procedures, the CWA relied
heavily on the local and state governments to sponsor appropriate work-relief
programs. And like the WPA, the CWA attempted to require projects that would
offer work to both blue-collar and white-collar workers. By the time the CWA was
phased out, white-collar and professional workers filled 10 percent of its ranks.4
When questioned about his decision to fund unemployed artists and writers, Hopkins
replied that those people have "got to eat just like other people."5 At the peak of
its existence in mid-January 1934, more than 4 million people were employed on
CWA projects. Though it only lasted from November 1933 through March 1934,16
CWA pumped $1 billion of purchasing power into the economy.6
An unfortunate legacy of the CWA was the image of the idle leaf-raker. Such
appellations sprang from the hasty manner in which the program was first set up. In
the desire to quickly employ workers, projects were started that were not well-
planned: people would arrive at a work site without the necessary equipment; an
observer might see fifty men working on a road project, but only twenty-five would
have the proper tools to do the job--the others would either be standing around
waiting for supplies or would be working with pick and shovel. Because much of the
early CWA work was clearing brush and landscaping parks, it is easy to understand
where the image might have originated.
Because of the emergency nature of most of the projects, in one sense the
image was true. The first goal of Hopkins and the CWA was to immediately see that
people had jobs. Executive Order 6420-B, creating the CWA, was dated November
9, 1933; by November 23, the first pay day, the CWA issued checks to 814,511
workers' Obviously, such haste resulted in confusion. One of the ongoing problems
(and one that originally plagued the WPA) was the inability to smoothly coordinate
the materials needed for the project, the activities of those needing work, and the
actual work itself.Frequently, thisresulted in programs being characterized as
"make-work" or more familiarly, leaf-raking work. Though planning, equipment, and
supply coordination improved through the year, the early stereotypes of the program
persisted.
When the CWA program came to an end in the spring of 1934, workers either17
left the projects or were transferred to a new emergency relief program sponsored
by FERA. During its brief history, CWA built or improved some 500,000 miles of
roads, 40,000 schools, over 3,500 playgrounds and athletic fields, and 1,000 airports.8
Moreover, the program provided proof that those on relief preferred to work
for a salary rather than receive direct relief. Dixon Wecter quotes a Michigan county
administrator who observed men weeping with happiness at the sight of their first
paycheck.9 Perhaps even more poignant is the comment of a woman whose husband
had just been hired on a CWA project; she bought a dozen oranges, saying "I hadn't
tasted any for so long I had forgotten what they were like."10
Despite the program's success in getting money to the people who needed it,
and despite the original support it had from the Roosevelt administration, CWA soon
came under attack. While there were those who were suspicious of any federal relief
program, the major attacks were politically motivated. Southerners objected to CWA
regulations requiring that blacks and whites be paid the same wages. Republicans
accused the Democrats of using CWA to dispense patronage. Eventually, Roosevelt
began to worry about the political consequences of supporting a program that might
create a permanent class of workers dependent on government aid. He summed up
the feelings of many when he told his advisors to bring an end to the CWA because
work relief might "become a habit with the country"11 FERA, which continued to
dispense direct relief through the grants-in-aid program, completed unfinished CWA
projects. Work relief under FERA lasted into July 1935 when the WPA program
replaced it.18
Although CWA is a chronological link between FERA and WPA, on two
counts it differed significantly from either of those programs. It was the only public
relief program that paid prevailing wages throughout its existence. While the original
intent of WPA administrators was to follow this practice, there was never sufficient
financial support to do so. Moreover, neither the Roosevelt administration nor the
general public was philosophically willing to have a government program that would
compete with private enterprise. Under WPA regulations workers were allowed to
earn a maximum monthly salary; once that point was reached, the worker was laid
off from the job.
The other significant difference between CWA and WPA was the means test
used to determine qualification for participation in the program. No such tests were
required to qualify for CWA employment. With WPA, all aspects of a worker's
financial life were examined. If that person or anyone in the immediate family had
income, even though it was inadequate to support the family, the worker was
ineligible for WPA employment. Such practice discouraged savings and blurred the
line between work relief and charity.In an article on work relief and traditional
American values, William Bremer notes that with the exception of CWA, work relief
programs under the New Deal were not meant to provide an adequate wage level for
support. Bremer writes, "Instead of guaranteeing a 'right to work' by instituting
programs to offer employment to people who experienced joblessness during good
times as well as bad, they developed an unemployment insurance system to preclude
the need to assist temporarily unemployed, able-bodied citizens at public expense."'19
The Works Progress Administration
The Roosevelt administration continued to search for a program that would
return providing of direct relief to the states, allowing the federal government to be
involved only in work relief programs. The establishment of the Works Progress
Administration was the answer. Roosevelt and his advisors knew that there were
many in the country, on both the right and the left, who wanted government out of
the business of providing direct relief. Business leaders feared that the continuation
of government programs aimed at helping the unemployed would result in a welfare
state. Organized labor opposed federal employment programs because federal wage
rates were below those offered by private industry.13According to conservative
Republican Robert Taft, the government should solve the unemployment problem
by encouraging more development in private industry.14 Among leftist critics, the
creation of a welfare state was an "indirect subsidy to business, making it even less
responsive to poverty and unemployment."15
Without clear directions from either side, Roosevelt consulted his advisors,
Harry Hopkins and Marriner Eccles, for a course of action. With 20 percent of the
labor force yet unemployed in 1935, Roosevelt announced his plan to have a "gigantic
program of emergency public employment."16 He selected Harry Hopkins to lead
the program. Hopkins had first worked with Roosevelt as deputy director of New
York State's Temporary Emergency Relief Administration.Later, Roosevelt
appointed him todirectthe programs of the Federal Emergency Relief20
Administration and those of the Civil Works Administration. Both Roosevelt and
Hopkins believed the states should bear a portion of the financial burden of any
proposed relief program, and both thought direct relief sapped worker morale. In
early 1935 Congress passed the first of a series of emergency relief appropriations
acts that provided $4.8 billion for work relief. On May 6, 1935, Roosevelt established
the Works Progress Administration, assigning to it $1.4 billion of the total $4.8
billion.
The establishment of the WPA satisfied the desire of both Roosevelt and the
Congress to have a work program rather than just a direct relief program.In
addition to the passage of the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act, Congress passed
the Social Security Act of 1935.This was important to the success of the WPA
because it provided financial aid to a portion of those individuals who were the most
difficult to find work for: people over 65 years old, the blind, and dependent children.
With those people removed from the concerns of the work relief program, the WPA
was ready to move into action.
While the WPA was a relief program, it differed from earlier schemes in that
it would provide only work relief. The states were once more responsible for the
provision of direct relief. Although certifying workers for WPA programs required
a close working relationship with state and county officials, only federal employees
administered the work program. As with the CWA, the states were obligated to
furnish the major funding needed for equipment and materials.State and local
officials were also expected to provide local supervision for projects. However, in21
contrast to CWA practices, WPA employees were chosen entirely from the relief
rolls, thus excluding those who were unemployed but who had not yet requested
relief. That provision was criticized throughout the existence of the program. Critics
believed it punished those who were trying to make it on their own without
government aid.
The Works Progress Administration built upon and expanded the adminis-
trative organization set up by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. The
expanded organization functioned through four levels: (1) the central administration
in Washington D.C. was responsible for setting policies; (2) the regional offices
covering eleven areas were responsible for acting as technical advisors both to the
Washington office and to the state office; (3) the state administrators were
responsible for final authority over its activities; and (4) the district offices were
responsible for proposing projects and for administering those that were approved.17
As was the case in Oregon, the state organizations were replicas of the federal one.
Unfortunately, that administrative network often resultedin delays in the
implementation of projects since each level of administration had to review projects
before they were given final approval at the federal level. Some of the guidelines
used to administer the program dealt with eligibility, quotas, sponsorship, and funding
requirements.
Eligibility for employment on WPA programs had specific limits; individuals
had to be on the relief rolls. Those who were unemployed but who continued to
look for work were not eligible for work relief. Furthermore, only one member of22
a household could be employed through the program even if the family was large,
in need, and had other able-bodied persons desiring employment.18 Those two
requirements plagued relief seekers in Oregon.The specific requirement for
eligibility stated that only those on the relief roles from May to November would be
eligible for WPA employment. In Oregon that policy resulted in complications for
those who were employed in the agricultural sector. Other requirements included:
a sixteen-year age minimum, no felony convictions, and residency in the state
providing work.
Although the primary objective of the WPA program was to hire only from
the relief rolls, there were exceptions. Exceptions were necessary to hire workers
who had experience at project supervision.In addition exceptions were made to
allow project managers to hire individuals with skills and professional expertise which
might not be found among those on the relief rolls.19 Exceptions were also made
to give those workers without a skill an opportunity to learn one. Allowances were
made to offer employment to the marginally needy and to those too proud to request
relief.Finally, as the WPA began to devote more funding to cultural projects,
exceptions were made for writers, authors, and others who qualified, but were not on
relief rolls.'
States also had to meet qualifications in order to be eligible for funds. The
most important was the requirement that each project had to have a sponsor.
Usually the sponsor would be a local or county jurisdiction, although in some cases
it might be the state. The importance of the local sponsors was both symbolic, in23
that it indicated local support for the program, and practical.It was up to the
sponsor to provide funding for supplies, and when possible, equipment. Sponsors
were also responsible for providing local supervision of projects. The use of local
sponsors served a political purpose since many states were concerned about the
intervention of the federal government in local matters.State and local leaders
believed that if they provided a portion of the funding for the projects they would be
able to maintain a greater voice in determining what projects would be done in their
jurisdictions. The federal government supported local involvement because federal
officials knew that the WPA would not succeed without state and local
participation.21
In his history of the WPA, Donald Howard notes that the majority of projects
were sponsored by municipal (39.3 percent), county (26.7 percent), and state (15.6
percent) agencies. The remaining sponsors were township (14.5 percent), federal (3.7
percent), and other (0.2 percent).22 The incentive to sponsor projects was the desire
of the jurisdictions to obtain local improvements and aid unemployment at a
reasonable cost.From 1936 to the end of June 1943 sponsors contributed 21.9
percent of the funds spent on WPA projects.23 The most popular projects included:
highway, road, and street improvement; the repair or construction of public buildings;
the development or improvement of parks and other recreational facilities;
conservation; the repair or building of sewer systems and other utilities; and the
construction of airports and other transportation facilities.White-collar work
included such diverse projects as sewing, educational and cultural programs, clerical24
training, and a variety of service programs
Funding for WPA projects was done through the passage of the Emergency
Relief and Appropriations Act. The original 1935 Act provided funds that were to
be spent within two years. When it seemed that the United States was coming out
of the depression in 1937, the funding of relief projects was more controversial.
Roosevelt asked for and received less funding than he had in 1935. As a result of
the inadequate appropriations, 35,000 people were dropped from the relief roles.
That inability to count on regular funding caused difficulties for the states. Some
local bodies were reluctant to support projects because of the uncertainty of the
support being renewed at the end of the fiscal year. The difficulty was an ongoing
one for the WPA and was never satisfactorily resolved. Because states were also
vying for funds from the Public Works Administration (PWA), it was necessary to
distinguish eligibility for WPA funding. The rule of thumb was that WPA projects
cost less than $25,000 and must benefit the public health and welfare. PWA
activities included major construction projects such as dams, schools, and highways
that involved large expenses. Harry Hopkins was often able to find ways around the
$25,000 limit by dividing projects into smaller increments.
The work programs of the WPA continued in place throughout the 1930s and
into the 1940s. In 1939, in an effort to bring about more efficiency in government,
the Roosevelt administration passed the Reorganization Act. Under that act the
Works Progress Administration was renamed the Works Projects Administration and,
along with other work relief agencies, was transferred to the newly created Federal25
Works Agency. Earlier, Harry Hopkins had resigned his position with the WPA to
become a special advisor to Roosevelt on domestic and foreign matters. A former
head of the Engineering Division, Colonel Francis C. Harrington, was appointed the
new WPA director. Under his leadership, the WPA began to take on large-scale
construction projects.
As the United States began to prepare for entrance into the war, WPA
projects became more defense-related. In 1941 Congress sanctioned that trend by
allowing WPA employees to work on construction projections costing more than
$100,000. WPA workers were also permitted to work in excess of the normal 130
hours per month limit if they were employed on defense or war-related projects .25
However, as war preparation advanced, the demand for workers in the private sector
increased. Because the government was unable to match private industry salaries,
men and women began leaving their WPA positions for those better paying jobs. In
March 1942, with only 5,000 WPA projects in operation, Roosevelt instructed the
Federal Works Administrator to begin shutting down the program. On June 30,
1943, the WPA was officially over.26
CHAPTER III
THE DEPRESSION IN OREGON
The depression got off to an early start in the state of Oregon. Unlike some
other states, Oregon felt the effects of the economic downturn quite early. Between
1927 and 1929 Oregon had the highest rate of business failures in the country.1
Much of the early downturn in the state's economy was a result of the decline in the
timber industry, Oregon's primary employer. Lumber mills were operating at half
of the their capacity by 1930 and demand continued to decrease.'Using 1929 as
a base year, the lumber industry dropped in employment from 100 percent to 40.0
percent in 1933. For all other industries, the drop was from 100 percent in 1929 to
58.9 percent in 1933? The period from 1929 to 1933 also witnessed a reduction in
farm income. Farmers were able to purchase only about 57 percent as many goods
and services in 1932 as they did in 1929.4Portland had more than 13,000
unemployed in 1930, or 4.4 percent of its total population. That unemployment
record was the worst of the four largest West Coast cities.5
Although statistics indicate that Oregon was in economic difficulty, the leaders
of public opinion were reluctant to recognize the situation.The Oregon Voter
noted in June 1930 that while production in the lumber industry had fallen off by 40
percent and wheat exports were down, conditions in Oregon "continue to be
somewhat better than elsewhere on the Pacific Coast and considerably better than27
in the greater part of the United States:6 In fact, Oregon's Governor Julius Meier,
upon discovering a budget deficit of $2.5 million when he entered office, insisted that
the legislature slash spending.'Reflecting the belief of Herbert Hoover, Meier
thought that only an increase in business activity would result in an improved
economy.
Early Responses to the Depression
In attempting to deal with the effects of the depression, Oregon followed the
pattern of the rest of the United States and relied on local civic and charitable
organizations to provide relief to the unemployed and the needy. The prevailing
attitude of Oregonians towards relief, especially those charged with administering it,
was based on a 1854 law that detailed the chain of responsibility for caring for the
poor. The law which reflected the national tradition of relief funding stated that the
county courts were responsible for administering aid to the poor, that the liability for
the poor rested with the family, and that three month's county residency was required
before county relief would be granted.8 When the state's economy continued to
decline, local leaders began to seek new solutions for handling the problems of relief.
While local organizations were generous in their desire to help, they were
frequently unable to meet the demands placed upon them.9The primary
organization for handling the relief effort was a citizens group, the Civil Emergency
Committee of Portland. A subcommittee of that group, the Public Relations28
Committee, assumed direct responsibility for administering work programs. With a
budget of $300,000 in 1930, it began a work program for the unemployed designed
to provide work for 1,350 people at a salary of $24.00 a month. So great was the
demand by those wanting work that the allotment was reduced to $12.00. When
money ran out in 1931, voters approved an additional $200,000 and when that, too,
was exhausted voters approved another $200,000. Although the citizens of Portland
were supportive of relief programs to help the unemployed, funding such programs
was beyond their abilities.
In areas outside of Portland, the picture was even bleaker. Most counties
were unable to mount a campaign to provide relief to the unemployed with the result
that funds were administered by the county judges. Unfortunately, most of those
judges were not oriented toward social services and continued to reflect traditional
attitudes that the needy were ne'er-do-wells who were responsible for their condition.
Relief work was poorly coordinated and never provided on a regular basis. One
writer of the period observed, "That few or none actually died of starvation during
this period is due not to such an unco-ordinated relief system, but to the
resourcefulness of the unemployed themselves."10In counties that were more
sympathetic to the poor, attempts were made to provide help but funding was
inadequate.11
Finally, in the fall of 1930 the state recognized that the increase in
unemployment demanded state-wide action. Governor A. W. Norblad called for an
Oregon economic conference to discuss the unemployment problem. Within two29
months of that conference, the governor appointed a volunteer group, the State
Emergency Employment Commission.Originally composed of the governor, the
chair of the highway commission and the labor commissioner, it was expanded under
Governor Meier to include two additional members, one of them from the Oregon
Federation of Labor. The group's charge was to speed up aid to the unemployed so
"no man willing and able to work for support of himself and his family should ever
become the object of charity in Oregon."12 The commission also encouraged the
counties to establish emergency relief committees to help provide aid for the
unemployed. Governor Meier called for a meeting of the county relief committees
in 1932 and as a result, there was formed the Executive Committee of the State-Wide
Relief Council. Later this group became known as the State Relief Committee.
The only other major source of state funding during this period was the State
Highway Commission.Since the Highway Commission was able to issue bonds
without seeking authorization outside of itself, it was in a unique position to help
provide work relief programs for the counties. Using highway funds, workers were
hired to do clean-up work, brush-clearing, and other unskilled labor. Almost $3
million had been allocated for work on the state's highways by the end of 1931.13
In March 1932, in spite of the protest of relief administrators throughout the state,
the Highway Commission discontinued its work relief program arguing that it was not
a responsible use of public funds to hire inexperienced workers and that it was more
efficient to contract out projects.1430
State Relief Committee
Governor Meier continued to believe that the state of Oregon had enough
internal resources to meet emergencies resulting from the growing depression crisis.
Hence, he concentrated his relief efforts on programs that he believed would result
in a more efficient organization of those resources.15 Although he was willing to
accept funding from the Highway Commission for relief work, he focused his energies
on the work of the State-wide Relief Council. The group, soon to be known as the
State Relief Committee, was advisory and was charged with coordinating the county
relief efforts throughout the state. In order to do this, the group set out to gather
as much information as possible on unemployment conditions. In 1932 it contacted
the county relief agencies and requested the following information: the number of
unemployed; the amount spent on relief; and any other information that would
provide a clearer understanding of county needs. Next, members of the State Relief
Committee divided into smaller groups to visit selected counties. According to a
confidential report made by the group to Governor Meier, unemployment would
continue to increase in the state. Reserves in clothing, food and money, the report
noted, would soon be exhausted with no hope for improvement in the next year; rent,
utility bills, and other payments would keep increasing and either would not be paid
or would be delinquent. Finally, it predicted that counties would be unable to meet
the demands for relief without outside help.16 At the time the report was issued,
the only means for providing work relief was the Highway Commission fund.31
The committee's primary concern was fear of the growing danger of
malnutrition in both children and adults. One of its suggestions was to establish state
food exchanges that would transfer food from areas of plenty to areas of need. To
facilitate this, they established a special food committee that would receive reports
of food surpluses and deficits, and act as a clearinghouse "to bring the traders
together to negotiate their own deals."17
The group took an interesting side road in its recommendation for a form of
script to be adopted as payment to workers. The script would be printed under strict
guidelines at the state printing plant. It would be redeemed, in exchange for work
completed, in amounts of $.25, $.50, $1.00 and $5.00. The idea was rejected in the
final report because it "appears predicated upon an acknowledged collapse of our
present economic system."' Instead the committee proposed a plan that called for
the use of script in food exchange. The plan would provide for a labor investment
fund in each county.Businesses that were currently donating money to relief
agencies would instead contribute to the fund and receive script. They would hire
workers for a job and pay them in script; the worker would in turn use the script to
purchase food. Although script was not used as a means for providing relief in
Oregon, the fact that it was contemplated by such a blue-ribbon committee is an
indication of how far from traditional thinking about relief some Oregonians had
moved.
A final concern of the State Relief Committee was the influx of unemployed
laborers from other states. In its investigations, they found that most counties had32
temporary arrangements to accommodate transient laborers. At their meeting in
Klamath Falls, they were told that the city's Labor Council was opposed to providing
jobs for itinerant workers because it would take work away from the local
unemployed.The county's solution was to establish small enclosures called
"Hoovervilles". An itinerant was allowed to remain in the camp for twenty-four hours
and then urged to move on. The committee's report quoted the Klamath Falls Chief
of Police: "We haven't been hard on them; we are afraid to run them out hungry for
fear of robbery.' The committee also worked with the Employment Service of the
United States Department of Labor to set up a temporary labor information bureau
near the border between Oregon and California. The purpose of the bureau was to
tell those unemployed laborers entering the state that there was no work to be had
in Oregon and to encourage them to return to their point of departure.2°
In the fall of 1932, the State Relief Committee warned Meier that it would
cost the state $6,204,812 to meet the relief bills anticipated for 1933.Meier,
unwilling to accept such a cost, continued to tell the public that the state could
handle its own financial problems. However, even as he was espousing optimism,
Meier was wiring Hoover to tell him "We must have help from the federal
government if we are to avert suffering ...and possible uprisings."' Eventually,
Meier requested funding from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The RFC
granted eleven counties $270,532 in loans by December 31, 1932.In 1933, the
legislature enacted the State Unemployment Act, establishing the State Relief
Committee, formalizing the already existing voluntary committee and moving Oregon33
towards a more centralized means of handling relief funding in the state.
The committee consisted of the same individuals who were members of the
executive committee of the State Relief Committee: Raymond Wilcox of Portland,
chair; Paul Mans of Salem, secretary; Victor Moses representing the county courts;
Kathleen Gabriel representing the women's organizations; Ray Gill from the Grange;
Alex Barry representing the American Legion; Ben Osborne from the state
federation of labor; and Elmer Goudy, later secretary and eventual administrator for
the group. The committee's major power came from its legislative charge to dispense
funds from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Federal Emergency Relief
Administration, and State Emergency Relief Administration. Before applying for
relief, counties had to justify to the State Relief Committee their financial need. The
committee received the requests and then passed them on to the governor who made
the formal application. Ultimately, Oregon received $2,798,290 in Reconstruction
Finance Corporation grants.
FERA and CWA Programs in Oregon
In 1932 Meier began taking the first cautious steps towards meeting the relief
needs in Oregon. In that same year, Franklin Roosevelt was elected president. One
of the first acts of his administration was to urge states to take advantage of the
funding available through the Federal Emergency Relief Act. Oregon's governor
applied for assistance based upon recommendations of the State Relief Committee.34
Under the terms of the loan, Oregon would match each $1.00 of federal funds with
$2.00 of state funds. From mid-1933 to January 1935, FERA distributed $15 million
to the state. However, both Meier and the legislature continued to be reluctant to
support the increase in state funding required to meet FERA requirements. Finally,
they recommended approval of a state sales tax which would help raise funds for
relief support.The measure was overwhelmingly defeated:64,677 in favor to
156,182 opposed?
The State Relief Committee noted in its interim report that because of the
state's unwillingness to provide the required matching funds, there were never
sufficient monies available to address adequately the relief needs in the state. The
state continued to look to the counties to provide relief funds and those were soon
exhausted. As the report noted "the resources of the counties have been entirely
inadequate...[and]...the unemployed of the state have not received the full
benefit of the federal program. This points to the necessity of the state's contributing
its proper share of the cost of relief."23Or as Harry Hopkins angrily cabled
Governor Meier, "You are respectfully reminded that so far the state of Oregon has
done practically nothing to provide for the relief of its own needy citizens. "' The
following figures illustrate Hopkins' point.In the second quarter of 1934--April
through June--local agencies had contributed 1.5 percent to relief; the state, less than
one tenth of 1 percent; and the federal government, 98.4 percent.Nationally,
comparable figures were: local agencies, 14.7 percent; states 11 percent; and the
federal government, 74 percent's35
While the governor and the legislature were struggling with Hopkins over
Oregon's contribution to the state's relief programs, the governor was applying for
CWA monies. Meier's request was approved and Oregon received $6,527,264 in
federal funds. Administered by the State Relief Committee, CWA was established
to fund work, not charity. CWA monies were used to fund over 1,826 projects. Since
that figure does not include educational and service projects, the total contribution
of the CWA to Oregon was greater than indicated by the construction projects. Of
the 1,826 projects, the majority were for remodeling schools, building parks (including
a series of major playing fields in Salem), and road construction. Funds were also
allocated for sanitation projects, for repairing and repainting buildings other than
schools, and for service projects, including those for women.26
While CWA's accomplishments in Oregon were many, it was viewed as a
mixed blessing. An editorial in the Oregonian labeled the program too slow and
riddled with graft. The not-surprising advice of the editor was to leave the business
of stabilizing the economy to private enterprise.27 State Democratic leaders were
upset with the program because it was dominated by Republican party appointees
even though it was administered under the auspices of a Democratic president. That
was a result of Harry Hopkins' constant but unsuccessful desire to keep partisan
politics out of the administration of his work relief programs. As Forrest Walker has
observed, "Charges that he [Hopkins] used the relief program for political purposes
did not apply to the period of the CWA."28
When the CWA assistance ended in early 1934, Oregon continued to provide36
relief through FERA. The projects undertaken by the state and county relief
agencies were similar to those under CWA and were aimed at providing employment
and maintaining the "self-respect and family morale for the relief client".29 In the
interim between the end of the CWA and the start of the WPA, almost $12 million
was spent on public work projects in Oregon. In January 1935 more that 61 percent
of the workers on those projects were from the state relief rolls.'The work
projects were to be the last undertaken by the State Relief Committee. In 1935
Congress passed the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act which funded the Works
Progress (Projects) Administration. For Oregon, as for all the other states, it meant
that relief would be divided into two categories: direct relief administered at the state
level through the State Emergency Relief Administration--SERA; and work relief to
be administered through thestateofficeof thefederal Works Progress
Administration--WPA.37
CHAPTER IV
THE WORK PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION IN OREGON
The Works Progress Administration in Oregon incorporated much of the
organizational structure of the earlier FERA organization.However, unlike
programs in other states, the Oregon WPA did not take over the administrative staff
of the StateRelief Committee.Elmer Goudy, chairman of the State Relief
Committee (in 1939 the name of this agency was changed to the State Welfare
Commission) and former administrator of FERA and CWA, remained a part of the
state's relief effort. His agency was charged with certifying workers and determining
eligibility for relief rolls.When the WPA was established in Oregon, Goudy
continued to administer programs offering direct relief while new personnel were
selected for the works program.
The Administrative Organization
Emerson J. Griffith was selected as state administrator for Oregon. Griffith,
a former newspaperman, had been president of the Roosevelt-for-President League
in Oregon and had also served as state treasurer for the Democratic party. As a
reward for his work during the election, he was selected to head the Housing
Administration in Oregon. According to the Oregon Voter, Griffith was given the38
position with the assumption that he would use it to reward party favorites with
jobs.' Griffith had barely been on the job when he was tapped by Democratic party
leader James Farley to be in charge of the Works Progress Administration in
Oregon.After numerous conversations with Harry Hopkins concerning the
possibility of continuing his position as director of the Housing Administration,
Griffith accepted the WPA appointment. Griffith served as WPA administrator until
February 1942, when he was replaced by Harrison Devereaux who remained with the
program until it was phased out in 1943.
Griffith was aided by an assistant administrator, John Albright (from the
Union Pacific Company), and a director for personnel, James Redmen (from the
Portland office of Pacific Telephone). Later appointees included a director for the
projects division; a director for the labor management division; a director for the
finance division; and a director for the service division. That latter division included
responsibility for programs for women and for professional and clerical workers. In
an early reorganization, the labor management section was merged with the division
of employment and the personnel division was abolished. Personnel duties were
divided between the employment division and the state administrative office.2
The district offices parallelled the state organization. Each district had a
director and an assistant director in charge of the district divisions.3All district
appointments were subject to approval by Griffith's office.After a year, in an
attempt to provide greater centralization and efficiency, the district offices were
eliminated. In the new structure, planning was done at the state level but project39
supervision and site visits were done in the field by the field engineers and projects
superintendents. In this arrangement, the state office began to lose touch with the
projects in the local communities. Project supervision was too remote and it did not
allow for ongoing contact with local project sponsors. By 1937, district offices were
re-instated but the number of districts was reduced to four.
The four districts were divided as follows:District 1, with headquarters in
Pendleton, included most of the eastern portion of the state; District 2, with
headquarters in Portland, included Clatsop county in the north and Crook county in
the east; District 3, with headquarters in Salem, included the Willamette corridor
along with the coast counties north of Douglas county; and District 4, with
headquarters in Medford embraced the rest of the state. Administrative duties and
responsibility for projects were handled, whenever possible, at the district level.
District managers were responsible for coordinating projects with the Portland office.
In addition, the district manager was the field representative of the Projects division
(later renamed the Engineering and Construction division).
Once district boundaries were established and the organization was in place,
Griffith's office faced the task of developing work projects.The first ones by
necessity had to be those that would bring about immediate employment. The goal
of the program, according to Griffith, was "to remove a maximum number of persons
from the relief rolls to work in the shortest time possible:4Each jurisdiction
receiving funding under the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act was required to
send to Griffith's office a list of the employment skills needed and of the projects it40
was planning to undertake.
Each project was to be useful to the public and, at the same time, provide
employment for as many workers as possible. In addition, projects were to employ
workers at jobs that were comparable to work they had been doing before they
became unemployed. In order to accomplish that goal, the Portland office needed
to identify prospective sponsors, to identify a pool of workers available for
employment, and to obtain adequate equipment to accomplish the work.
Project Implementation
The first step in implementation was to identify a project and a local sponsor.
Sponsorship could be under the auspices of any public agency such as the state,
county or city, a school board or a similar jurisdiction. The pre-requisites for a
project were that it provide jobs for those currently on the relief rolls; be located in
areas reasonably close to where those needing employment lived; start immediately;
and be useful.5 The last point was a focus of controversy during the existence of the
WPA. Griffith noted in an early edition of the WPA monthly bulletin, "Before we
pass judgement ... onthe merit of any particular project, we should consider the fact
that people have different opinions as to value
Although public agencies were eager to sponsor projects, they were cautious
because of the uncertainty of ongoing federal funding. The continuation of the WPA
depended on annual Congressional approval of funds. For that reason sponsors were41
reluctant to undertake any project that required long-range planning.Later, as
sponsors' contribution requirements were increased, it became more difficult for
jurisdictions to budget for projects.Oregon had, at that time, a 6 percent tax
limitation law that made it difficult for public agencies to find additional funding for
work projects.Sponsorship of a project also meant that the jurisdiction, in
conjunction with the district manager, would plan the project. Plans were submitted
to the state office and from there to the regional center and finally to Washington,
D.C. Once approved, the plans were sent back to the district for implementation,
a practice that was time-consuming and discouraged quick action. While many of
those involved with the WPA criticized the procedure, it remained in place
throughout the program.
Local sponsors were encouraged to monitor the daily progress of the project
and to make adaptations to local conditions whenever necessary. Occasions arose
when the same equipment was needed for more than one job. In those situations,
the sponsor was allowed to remove the equipment while project work was either
slowed or temporarily suspended.7 Sponsors also agreed to complete the project or
a major unit of it if, for some reason, WPA funds were withdrawn. In general, most
local jurisdictions were glad to have the opportunity to sponsor a project. As long
as the state and local governments were required to fund direct relief, it was in their
interest to move those on relief to a federally-funded project and off relief rolls.
A difficulty confronting the Oregon WPA was that most of the state's
unemployed population clustered around the Portland metropolitan area.The42
problem was in finding enough projects to provide work for them and at the same
time benefit areas of the state that did not have a sufficient number of people on
relief to qualify for large projects.
Griffith's office solved this by having several jurisdictions cooperatively
sponsor a project.That had the benefit of providing more state funding, and it
allowed the less populated areas an opportunity to participate in WPA. An
outstanding example of this was the construction of the Wolf Creek Highway
(Highway 26) and the Wilson River Highway which provided direct access from the
Portland area to the coast. The project, while under the leadership of the Highway
Commission, involved WPA sponsorship in five counties.
The state administrator's office compiled a backlog of projects and had at
hand a list of projects that could be quickly put into place. The level of backlog was
kept at approximately 50 percent more man-months than was necessary to meet the
state's employment quota.8
Once a sponsor and a project had been selected, workers had to be identified
who met eligibility standards. In most instances, that was the job of the State Relief
Committee. Committee employees would search the relief rolls for qualified workers
who were currently unemployed and suggested them for WPA employment. In the
early days of Griffith's administration, the largest pool of available workers were
those classified as unskilled. There were two reasons for that classification. Under
FERA, most jobs available were for unskilled workers. Although the WPA was
organized to employ workers with a variety of talents, most applicants chose to check43
"unskilled" on the work application because they believed that such a classification
would make them more employable. Once the service projects were established,
many of those workers were transferred to projects that required clerical or
professional expertise.9
The final hurdle to overcome in planning a project was the availability of
equipment. Because of the seemingly temporary nature of the WPA, there was a
reluctance on both the state and local level to invest in heavy equipment. As the
depression continued, and as more districts were requesting large scale projects, state
officials established a warehouse and supply unit. Project sponsors were able to rent
heavy equipment on an "as needed" basis. By establishing the unit, the state office
was able to spread equipment costs over the entire state.
With the first stages of the organization completed, Griffith's administration
began the transfer of individuals from relief programs to WPA projects. In June
1935, nearly 18,000 workers were transferred.1° As was the case at the national
level, the early assignments were not well conceived, and workers were thrust into
work situations for which they were unprepared. According to the Oregon Voter,
many of the WPA work assignments were made "in haste, most of them unadapted
to individual fitness, most of them outdoors under conditions which cannot be faced
without heavy clothing and boots."11 Many workers were sent home because they
did not have adequate clothing for the weather conditions.
Eventually, those early logistical difficulties were overcome. Two problems
which continued to plague the Oregon WPA throughout its existence were the labor44
unions and the quota system.In an article in the Oregonian, labor leader Ben
Osborne assailed WPA wage scales saying that they averaged 60 cents an hour, far
below the prevailing scale. Although this was true, WPA wages were higher than
relief payments. The unions feared that WPA wage scales would drive down wages
for non-WPA employees.Griffith, repeating the position of the Roosevelt
administration, said that WPA workers were on jobs created for them and that they
should be content with subsistence wages. He remarked, "We have a limited amount
of money to pay the wages of a great number of men and women and we can't
spread it around the way we intended unless a subsistence wage is paid."12 The
issue of prevailing versus subsistence scales was never entirely resolved during the
lifetime of the WPA in Oregon. The district offices, at times, objected to the policy
of paying less than prevailing wages because it added to their difficulty in hiring
experienced project supervisors.Later, Oregon administrators recognized the
problem and made accommodations whenever necessary to get around the provision.
Unions also objected to using unskilled workers on projects requiring highly
skilled labor. According to the unions, such practices deprived skilled workers of
jobs and forced them onto the relief rolls.13 In reality, work was available because
the sponsors were receiving WPA funding.Without that funding and the
requirement to use it on the unemployed, the projects would not have been
undertaken. The unions' arguments were similar to those made throughout the
depression by the business community. Business claimed that the federal government
was taking money away from the private sector by financing building projects. Yet,45
without federal aid, most of the projects would not have been built.
Another ongoing difficulty for the Oregon office was the quota system.
Quotas were assigned by the national office and changed regularly. The state's
employment quota was based on its total population and on the proportion of its
families on relief.14 Because the WPA was never intended to replace private sector
employment, quotas fluctuated according to the strength of the marketplace.
The quota system was harmful to Oregon because of its impact on seasonal
employment and the consequent pitting of the agricultural sector against the WPA.
As the time for seasonal employment approached, farmers demanded that quotas be
reduced in order to create a pool of unemployed labor. In response, the WPA urged
workers to leave WPA employment in order to accept agricultural employment.
Many WPA workers did so with disastrous results for themselves and the state relief
agency. As winter approached and the demand for seasonal workers was reduced,
those workers once more sought jobs with the WPA. They were refused re-
employment because summer quotas continued to be in place. Needing assistance,
they turned to the State Relief Committee at a rate of 50 to 100 people a day,
resulting in a financial crisis for that body.15
In 1936, when once more they were urged to apply for seasonal work, many
WPA employees refused to leave the federal project and risk jeopardizing their WPA
status.Leaders in the agricultural community decried the situation and the
Oregonian carried stories of outraged citizens who saw crops not getting harvested
while WPA employees continued with government work.The response of the46
national office was to reduce state quotas from 19,850 in March to 15,850 in June.
After announcing the reduction, national administrator Harry Hopkins commented,
"In establishing these employment figures for your state, consideration was given to
such factors as seasonal employment, farm employment and work opportunities."16
The Oregon Voter worried that private industry would be unable to absorb the
number of workers laid off from WPA work and that those workers would once again
flood state relief offices.17 Finally, in 1939, Griffith ruled that WPA employees who
left the organization for work would be given preferential treatment should they elect
to return to the WPA.
The quota system also worked against sponsors of projects since they could
never be sure if there would be an employment pool available to them. In 1939,
federal WPA officials threatened to slash overall quotas by 400,000. Oregon's share
of the cut amounted to 2,700 workers, meaning that number of people would be
removed from WPA employment even though they had no other jobs available to
them. In most cases, the likely projects to be shut down were in smaller towns,
where other means of employment were doubtful. When the final congressional
appropriations for 1939 were passed, Oregon lost 1,420 workers from WPA rolls.18
The purpose of quotas was to have a system that would ebb and flow in tune with
the economy; the result was to make ongoing planning extremely difficult. The quota
system plagued the Oregon WPA throughout the program's existence.
In addition to employment quotas, there were financial quotas, based on the
state administrator's estimate of the money it would take to fund the work projects.47
In the beginning of the program, it was difficult for Griffith to make more than an
educated guess on costs since the state had no previous financial history of funding
public works. The result was projects that were started without any indication of
when funds would be available. If no funds become available, workers were either
laid off or reassigned to other projects.Eventually, funding became more
predictable. Instead of learning in the beginning of the month what was that month's
allotment, state administrators were provided with three and four month's
notification. In turn, the state administrators developed a backlog of projects that
gave them a better basis for making budget predictions.
The WPA and the Politics of Oregon
At the time that Griffith was attempting to establish an effective organization
to administer the WPA programs, he was working in a political environment which
seesawed between support and hostility.Governor Charles Martin, a De,mocrat
elected on Roosevelt's coattails, began his tenure as governor in support of the
administration's policies. But he quickly established his opposition to most New Deal
programs by commenting that WPA monies should not have been allocated to the
states because "democratic nations have lost their moral force through pampering
their people." Later, he remarked that Harry Hopkins could "keep his money out of
Oregon."19Throughout his term as governor, Martin continued to oppose both
federal and state spending programs.Martin believed that those seeking relief48
should be able to live comfortably on $10.00 a month!' He, of course, did not
follow this practice, having the financial comfort of his salary as governor of Oregon
and his military pension.
Griffith also faced opposition from other Democrats who criticized him for
his unwillingness to use the WPA as a means for delivering patronage to Roosevelt
supporters. On the administrative level, the Oregon WPA was well-organized and
reasonably free from partisan politics. Unlike programs in other states which were
rampant with corruption, Oregon's program was viewed as being almost too non-
partisan.In a letter to James Farley, Chairman of the National Democratic
Committee, Fred Kelly of the Jackson county Democratic committee complained that
Griffith acted against party interest by being too non-partisan. Kelly was angered
that Griffith was hiring both Republicans and Democrats in the state organization.
Kelly was also upset by a memorandum issued through Griffith's office that
instructed administrative employees to maintain a non-partisan attitude within the
workplace and to refrain from political activity outside of the organization.21
Throughout his tenure as state administrator for the WPA, Griffith struggled
with the ambivalent attitude of Oregonians towards any federal involvement in state
affairs. As James Patterson has commented, "Westerners were already disposed to
distrust federal bureaucrats [and] they came to regard the Roosevelt administration
as an eastern, urban, indeed somewhat alien operation."22 Moreover, the state was
already feeling overburdened by its relief debts. Of the $10 spent by the state and
counties on relief, only $3 came from federal sources.'Oregonians wanted a49
balanced budget even it meant fewer services and fewer federal dollars. In discussing
the success of the WPA in Oregon, the Oregon Voter noted that the outstanding
achievements of the program were not at unreasonable cost to the state
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CHAPTER V
WPA PROJECTS IN OREGON
In the rush to find jobs and to begin spending money, public agencies turned
to the easiest projects they could find: those relying mainly on manual labor. Thus,
most of the early projects were labor intensive, relying much more on human
resources than on equipment. As with the Civil Works Programs, this is where some
of the early accusations of "leaf-raking" and "boondoggling" originated.' In the 1930s
both of those terms were used to describe unnecessary or wasteful work funded by
the federal government. A description of a project on 39th street in Portland is
indicative of some of the hostile attitudes towards WPA work projects: "there were
about fifty men graveling the side of the road, working with shovels and rakes. There
were too many men working in the space available. They lacked elbow room. Some
men continually tested the strength of their shovels by leaning on them."2Since
there were more bodies than tools, large numbers of people stood around.
Another ongoing difficulty for WPA administrators was finding project work
that would match the skills of those on the relief rolls. In the early months of the
program most of those hired were assigned to do manual labor. However, following
the pattern of the earlier Civil Works Program and the programs of the State
Employment Relief Administration, the WPA began to use the skills of professional
and white collar workers.51
The Service Projects
Several such programs, especially the service projects, were successful. Those
projects encompassed not only the art, music, theatre, and writers projects, but also
less well-known endeavors. Among the latter programs were the adult education, the
school lunch, and the sewing projects.In addition, there were numerous
organizations throughout the state such as the State Planning Commission that took
advantage of WPA funds to hire skilled clerical workers.
An advantage to the professional and white collar projects was that they
frequently could be put into place anywhere in the state. Almost every community
had need of small scale projects that would employ clerical or service workers. For
example, the school lunch program was the type of project that required very little
in the way of equipment and supplies and which was extremely successful. The goal
of this project was to prepare and serve meals to school children. Participants could
be involved at several levels, ranging from raising food in their gardens to picking
and preserving fresh food. Interested persons could also serve the lunches. Clerical
support was used to organize the program and to keep daily records of the services.
According to a WPA report, the school lunch program was developed in response to
a demand from school officials and others that school children be fed. At its close,
90 percent of the "schools throughout the state were serving complete meals without
cost to the child."3
Another important service project in Oregon was the sewing project whose52
purpose was to employ unemployed and unskilled women who had no previous work
experience. The projects were sponsored by the county relief agencies and were
established wherever space and equipment were available. Although early projects
were labor intensive, the work was later centralized and organized on a state-wide
level.4 Up until World War II, clothing and other articles produced by women on
the sewing project was distributed to hospitals and needy families throughout the
state. Once the war had begun, the majority of women on the sewing project were
absorbed into the war industry. By June 1942, approximately 2 million garments had
been produced by the project.
Service projects played a major public relations role for the WPA because
they often brought together officials who planned the project and local communities.
In many small cities and towns, this contact might be the only one residents would
have with a federal agency. Representatives of the community were able to learn
about the WPA, and the WPA was able to hear what the community thought about
their programs.5 Often programs were continued by the community when WPA
funding ended.In many areas, the nursery school and library programs were
continued by volunteers and financed by local contributions.Service projects
continued to be a major public relations channel for the WPA throughout its
existence.53
Federal Project No. 1
The cultural projects unlike the other service projects were not administered
by Griffith's organization. Those projects were designated, "Federal Project Number
1". They included the arts, music, theatre and writers projects and the Historical
Records Survey. Unlike other programs that were initiated at the local level and
referred up through the hierarchy, the four cultural projects and the records survey
were sponsored and funded by the national office of the WPA.6 Federal WPA
administrator Harry Hopkins reasoned that most states would be unlikely to fund
projects that did not have an obvious financial payback to the local communities.
Centralization also guaranteed a uniform approach and structure to the projects.
Each cultural project had its own national and state administrator who was not
responsible to the state WPA administrator. However, since the administrator of the
cultural projects often relied on the state WPA machinery to carry out their
programs, the cultural projects which were most successful were the ones in which
the two administrators worked cooperatively.While local sponsors were not
required, local cooperation was usually necessary because most projects required the
use of local facilities.
Of all of the four cultural projects, the best known and most successful in
Oregon was the writers' project.It was supported well on the state level because
WPA administrator Griffith, a former journalist and fiction writer, believed in the
federal funding for the cultural projects.' He was active in leading the search for54
an administrator for the program and recommended the hiring of Alfred Powers for
the post. During the seven years of its existence, the writers' project was responsible
for numerous publications of both fiction and non-fiction. Unlike some other states
that had several well-known or soon-to-be well-known writers working for it, the
Oregon Writers' Project did not produce great and/or controversial works of art.
According to one writer it had a "penchant for undertaking a variety of trifling
activities."8 While that may be true, the Oregon Writers' project was responsible for
compiling one of the most fact-filled books on Oregon history, the Oregon Guide.
The state guide which was part of a major WPA project, the American Guide series,
was a great success for the Oregon Writers' Project. Years after its publication, the
Guide continues to be a fount of information on the cities and towns of Oregon.
While the Federal Arts Project for Oregon was not as well known, it too, has
left an enduring legacy. The interior decoration of Timberline Lodge (the entire
lodge was a major construction project for the Oregon WPA) is probably the best
known of all of the Oregon WPA projects and the one that comes most quickly to
people's mind when the WPA is mentioned. The art work on Timberline included
paintings and handicrafts, pieces and furniture, relief carvings, and a variety of murals
and glass mosaics.9In addition to this work, the Arts Project undertook small
projects throughout the state, including much of the ornamental iron work found on
the campuses of the University of Oregon and Oregon State University.10
The Music and the Theatre projects are not as well remembered today.
Because music projects had been organized by FERA, they were put into place more55
quickly than the other cultural projects. At the time, they provided employment for
both amateur and professional artists, writers, and composers. Although most of the
programs were performed in Portland, many of the smaller cities and towns had their
local orchestras and band concerts in the park. One writer has praised the music
program, saying that an advantage of that program and the other cultural programs
was that they included people who were "drawn from pick and shovel work.
Naturally, such work was very distasteful and a waste of talent."11
Another major undertaking by the Works Projects Administration was the
Historical Records Survey.In Oregon, the Historical Records Survey and the
Writers' Project were both under the same state director. The primary goal of the
Records Survey was to locate, arrange, and catalog historical records. Once this was
completed, project workers prepared and published an inventory. Since most of the
records were state, county, and city government archives, the Survey collected a
wealth of information for present and future historians. The historical records survey
was also an example of the way the WPA attempted to match workers to the work.
Many unemployed clerical workers, teachers, librarians, and historians were
employed in the task of compiling data for its surveys.
The service projects were popular and frequently, as with the sewing and the
school lunch projects, provided necessary services.Yet, the major source of
employment continued to be the works projects. They also presented major logistical
difficulties for the Oregon WPA.56
The Work Projects
Clearly, not all WPA projects could be located in a single geographical place.
Yet, the main source of capital and the highest rate of unemployment was in the
Portland metropolitan area. While the first year of the WPA was spent in finding
projects that could create immediate employment, the second year focused on
developing long range plans. These plans included major projects that would use
workers from the Portland area but which would be located elsewhere. It benefitted
those areas wanting to take advantage of the WPA monies but which did not have
a sufficient labor pool--either in size or in skill.
Most of the projects developed for that purpose were either road-building or
water works projects. In order to carry them out, workers were moved from their
homes to the location of the construction sites, where housing and sanitary facilities
were frequently inadequate. Before a project could be started, work camps had to
be constructed. The Wilson River Highway and the Wolf Creek Highway projects
were built by workers housed in camps. One camp on the Tillamook section of the
Wilson Highway accommodated 150 workers, while Camp McNamers ten miles away
was designed for 350 occupants.
Construction of the camps, most frequently undertaken by WPA workers,
included bunk houses, kitchens, mess halls, and an infirmary. For the most part, the
buildings were portable so they could be re-used. Once the camps were completed,
they were staffed whenever possible by WPA workers. Thus, although the thrust of57
the projects was to hire laborers, they also created jobs for white collar and
professional people. The work camps provided many workers with housing, regular
meals, and medical treatment. Although this was better treatment then most had
had in months, the relocation of workers into work camps at times met resistance.
An article in the Coos Bay Times describes the anger of workers who faced the
choice of being laid off their WPA job or being transferred to Yachats and separated
from their families. Some workers told reporters that they would rather stay at home
and starve than be moved from their homes.12
A continual problem faced by the Oregon WPA was the lack of adequate
equipment and materials. In order to provide work relief quickly during its early
months, the WPA took over many of the projects being done under the auspices of
the State Relief Committee. The only tools available at that time were those left
over from the FERA and CWA projects -- pickaxes and shovels. Frequently, WPA
project leaders had to rent or borrow equipment from the sponsor in order to
complete their assignments. Added to that complication was lack of a warehouse and
supply unit. Without a central supply area, there was no way to make equipment
available throughout a district, nor was there a place to store equipment not being
used.After the first year of operation, a Works Projects Administration Supply
Section was established that was responsible for purchasing equipment and materials
and for supplying them to the districts.While the local sponsor was the major
contributor in providing the equipment, the supply section insured that large projects
could be undertaken with greater ease.58
The unwillingness of the Congress to fund the WPA for more than a year at
a time was another problem when the state attempted to undertake large projects.
Frequently, sponsors were reluctant to provide support for big construction projects
when there was no guarantee that funding would be forthcoming.Moreover,
qualified workers from the private sector, who were needed to supervise projects,
were reluctant to leave their jobs for what they viewed as a temporary situation.13
While Washington administrator Harry Hopkins generally received the total funding
he requested, the amount distributed to each state would vary yearly.
By the end of the WPA in Oregon, the planning and implementing of major
construction projects was a reasonably smooth process.For the larger service
programs, particularly the sewing projects, logistics continued to be a problem. The
primary difficulty was that those projects, too, required major equipment but, unlike
the construction work, the equipment needed to be permanently assigned to an area.
For example, the sewing project needed heavy-duty power machines in order to
operate successfully.As long as a local community had a sewing project, the
machines were required. In addition, many areas needed special facilities to house
the workers when they were on duty. Ultimately, the responsibility for furnishing and
housing equipment rested with the particular project.
As the United States began to prepare for war, many of the projects in both
the construction and the service areas became defense-oriented. The work previously
accomplished by the Oregon WPA also lent itself to the war effort.This was
particularly true of the construction of major highways and civilian airport facilities.59
The transition to more defense-related activities was also easy for those working in
the writers' project.In fact, the first suggestion that the Writers' Project become
involved in wartime propaganda came from T. J. Edmunds, the Writers' Project
administrator who succeeded Alfred Powers.14Writers on the project produced
scripts and press releases for the armed services and put together a series of
pamphlets describing Oregon's wartime resources. About one half of the fifty writers
still with the project worked full-time for the United States Army's recruiting
services.15
As the United States moved closer to war, employment moved away from
WPA projects and to war-related activity. When the WPA was officially ended in
1943, only eighty-seven persons remained on WPA projects.60
CONCLUSION
The WPA was one of the many Roosevelt administration programs aimed at
returning the economy to a productive level. Because Roosevelt and his advisors
believed that work programs were morally better than direct relief, the emphasis
throughout the depression was to find a program that would not bankrupt the
government and that would create jobs. The WPA was one of those programs.
Because the local and state agencies were unable to meet the growing relief
needs of the population, the work relief provided by WPA projects was a necessity
in the state of Oregon. Yet, as James Patterson notes, "The West, long a stronghold
of rugged individualism, faced only reluctantly the need for generous, long-term state
spending for relief and welfare."' That reluctance was demonstrated in the ongoing
opposition of governor Charles Martin and other state elected officials to support
legislation which would help in funding WPA and other federal programs. Nor did
citizens appear willing to support more than basic relief measures. A 1936 sales tax
that would have offered funding for relief and old age assistance was defeated by a
six to one margin. Oregonians were, however, willing to accept federal funds. As
Leonard Arrington shows in his statistical analysis of New Deal funding, Oregon
ranked eleventh among the states in the amount of per capita expenditures spent by
the WPA in the state.2
The depression of the 1930s accelerated the shift in the balance of power
between Oregon and the federal government. The obvious manifestation of that shift61
was the increase in federal funds and federal regulations that accompanied the relief
and work programs of the Roosevelt administration. Programs of both the Civil
Works Administration and the Works Progress Administration were federal overlays
on the state government. Administrators in those programs were federal employees
who were bound by national regulations and who were loyal to them, not the state
government. A more tangible sign of that shift was reflected in the change of the
state's infrastructure. Under the auspices of the WPA, the physical appearance of
Oregon was significantly modified.WPA workers constructed 4,934 miles of
highways and roads, built 306 bridges and remodeled 124 older ones, installed 340
miles of water mains, drained 22,383 acres of land, and built or improved 324 playing
fields and parks.3 Although many of the major construction projects were in the
Portland metropolitan area, the Service and Art projects were implemented
throughout the state. The program's major construction project, Timberline Lodge,
stands as a magnificent symbol of the WPA's legacy and continues to this day to be
a major attraction. The Oregon Writers' Project's major undertaking, Guide to
Oregon, has been updated and is still considered a useful source for Oregon
historical and travel information.
In terms of organizational structure and administrative difficulties, the Oregon
WPA was fairly standard. It replicated other states in its organization, building onto
the structure of the earlier FERA program whenever possible. The problems faced
by Griffith and other WPA administrators were primarily due to federal restrictions.
Uncertainty over funding and employment quotas made long-range planning an62
impossibility. That, in turn, made local sponsors wary of supporting large projects
that might be cancelled if funding were withdrawn.
The unwillingness of the Roosevelt administration to commit to a viable
federally-funded work relief program also harmed the state program. Reliance on
a means test, the ability to pay only subsistence wages, and the insistence that a labor
pool be available for summer and fall crop harvesting all worked against the Oregon
program.These barriers reflected the opposition of powerful interests in state
politics and the political conservatism of the people of Oregon.
Robert Burton in his essay on the New Deal and Oregon explores the
possibility that the depression could have altered the political climate of the state.
The conditions caused by the depression and the programs of the Roosevelt
administration, along with Oregon's history of political experimentation, offered
Oregonians an opportunity for an innovative approach to solving the relief needs of
its citizens. In theory, Oregon leaders might have taken advantage of the funding
programs of the thirties to develop a new method for providing for the state's
unemployed and needy. "Oregon's relief committees prepared the state well in terms
of familiarizing Oregonians with work relief ideas."4 Yet, Oregonians did not take
that creative step.Throughout the thirties, fiscal cooperation with the federal
government came slowly and grudgingly.5
There were some Oregonians including Governor Charles Martin who
believed that the WPA was a step towards socialism. That was certainly not the case.
Neither on the national nor the state level was the WPA intended to supplant private63
enterprise.In his study of the work relief programs of the New Deal, William
Bremer writes that the "WPA conformed to the unwritten, conservative rule that
prohibited government interference with an ongoing capitalist economy.'6In
retrospect, the WPA provided the people of Oregon with work relief and with an
improved infrastructure. It started a pattern of change in state-federal relations by
showing state legislatures the benefits of federal funding. It also led to a permanent
structure for providing relief benefits to the unemployed. Philosophically, however,
nothing was changed. Oregonians for the most part viewed the WPA as a stop gap
program that, had the economy functioned as it was supposed to, would not have
been necessary. State authorities continued to congratulate themselves for getting
through the financial crisis of the thirties with a minimum of state support. In the
political arena New Deal programs such as the WPA did not usher in an age of
Democratic party rule. In the 1938 gubernatorial elections, the coalition candidate
State Senator Henry Hess was defeated by Republican Charles Sprague. As the
economy of the state improved and workers left relief work for defense work, the
concern for finding appropriate ways to provide relief funding were replaced with
concerns for winning the war. Burton describes the effect of the WPA in the state
when he writes, "Although the New Deal certainly left its mark on Oregon,it did not
prompt a revolution in habits of thought...the force of tradition has remained
strong in Oregon."
like most of the people in the West continued to view themselves
as rugged individualists who were able to succeed in spite of interference from the64
federal government.They have, when convenient, refused to recognize the
relationship between federal monies and the opening and the growth of the West.
Whether that relationship meant using United States Army troops to eliminate
Native Americans in order to pave the way for settlement or the use of
Congressional support for the development of a cross continental railroad, the federal
government has had a major role in the shaping of the West.To refuse to
acknowledge that role is to weave, in the words of Patricia Limerick, "a net of denial"
when contemplating their relationship with the federal government .8NOTES
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